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Abstract—For physical-layer authentication, the authentication
tags are often sent concurrently with messages without much
bandwidth expansion. In this paper, we present a channel coding
approach for physical-layer authentication. The generation of
authentication tags can be formulated as an encoding process
for an ensemble of codes, where the shared key between Alice
and Bob is considered as the input and the message is used to
specify a code from the ensemble of codes. Then, we show that the
security of physical-layer authentication schemes can be analyzed
through decoding and physical-layer authentication schemes can
potentially achieve both information-theoretic and computational
securities.
Index Terms—Physical-layer authentication, channel cod-
ing, decoding complexity, computational security, information-
theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
MESSAGE authentication codes (MACs) are crypto-graphic primitives used extensively in the construction
of security services, include authentication, nonrepudiation,
and integrity. Basically, message authentication is to ensure
that an accepted message truly comes from its acclaimed
transmitter. When the transmitter intends to send a message,
it also generates a MAC, which is a function of the message
and a shared key, known only to both the transmitter and the
receiver. The generated MAC is often appended to the message
[1]. At the receiver, a MAC is computed from the received
message and compared to the MAC that is transmitted. If the
two MACs are identical, then the transmitter is identified as
a legal user and it is highly likely the received message is
exactly equal to the one transmitted.
MAC algorithms can be constructed from other crypto-
graphic primitives, such as cryptographic hash functions or
from block cipher algorithms. Currently, the security of MAC
algorithms rely on the hardness of hush functions, i.e, given
the message and its MAC, it is “hard” to forge a MAC on a
new message.
As the development of mobile communications, ensuring
security of wireless communications has becoming increas-
ingly important. Openness of wireless networks makes them
vulnerable to spoofing attacks where an unauthorized user
masquerades as another legitimate user. Although conventional
cryptographic security mechanisms can be used to foil such
attacks above the physical layer [2], [3]. However, it was
believed that more efforts should be done to prevent potential
innovative attacks since the wireless medium offers novel
avenues for intrusion. In recent years, there has been various
efforts [4]–[7] in authenticating the sender and receiver at
the physical layer, based on prior coordination or secret
sharing, where the sender is authenticated if the receiver can
successfully demodulate and decode the transmission. Among
various reported works, it was commonly observed that the
physical properties of the wireless medium are a powerful
source of domain-specific information that can be used to
complement and enhance traditional security mechanisms [4].
In [6], a physical-layer authentication scheme was proposed,
in which MACs, along with messages, are transmitted con-
currently over the physical layer. Compared to the traditional
transmission approach above the physical layer, the authors
claims the possibility of information-security due to the in-
troduction of the noise. However, this is not justified in a
rigourous way.
In this paper, we provide a channel coding approach for
physical-layer authentication. Our contributions include two
aspects. Firstly, the computational security can be expressed
as the requirement for decoding complexity. Secondly, the
information security can be formulated for physical-layer
authentication schemes using the standard techniques for a
converse proof of channel coding theorem [8].
Throughout this paper, upper case letters (e.g., X ) will
denote random variables, lower case letters (e.g., x) will
denote realizations of the corresponding random variables. and
calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) will denote finite alphabet sets
over which corresponding variables range. Also, upper case
boldface letters (e.g., X ) will denote random vectors whereas
lower case boldface letters (e.g., x) will denote realizations of
the corresponding random vectors.
II. A CODING FORMULATION OF PHYSICAL-LAYER
AUTHENTICATION
A. Physical-Layer Authentication
Suppose that Alice and Bob agree on a keyed authentication
scheme that allows Bob to verify that the messages he receives
are from Alice. In order to authenticate, Alice sends an
authentication tag (or a MAC), along with a message, for
declaring his identity. We call the transmitted signal under
this scheme as the tagged signal.
Formally, Alice, as the sender, wants to transmit the au-
thentication tag T together with the message S so Bob (as
the receiver) can verify her identity. In general, the tag is a
function of the message S and the secret key K
T = τ(S,K), (1)
2where τ : S × K → T is a (hash) function.
In order to focus on the essential ideas, we assume here
that both the message S and tag T can be denoted as binary
random vectors with BPSK modulation. In what follows, we
do not discriminate between binary and bipolar vectors, as it
can be well understood from the text.
Often, the tag is a short string computed on the message S
to be authenticated and the shared secret key K . Let Ls, Lk, Lt
denote the length of the message S, the key K and the tag T ,
respectively. In practice, Ls ≫ Lt. Here, we always assume
that Ls = QLt, where Q is a large integer.
The tag is padded to the message and simultaneously
transmitted. The tagged signal (in a discrete column vector
form) can be written as
u = ρss+ ρttq, (2)
where 0 < ρs, ρt < 1, ρ2s + ρ2t = 1, and tq = ψ(t) is a
modulation process for modulating a binary tag string t into
the physical discrete-signal vector tg, which is chosen to meet
E[sHtq] = 0 [6]. Hence,we can interpret ρ2s and ρ2t as energy
allocations of the message and tag, respectively.
Essentially, for concurrent transmission of both message and
tag, the bit string of a tag should be transmitted with a much
lower rate ( 1Q ) than the message symbol rate. In [6], the Haar
wavelet is employed for modulating tags. In this paper, we,
however, assume a simple repetition function of ψ(·), namely,
each component of t is repeated Q times, which means that
ψ(t) = [t1, · · · , t1︸ ︷︷ ︸, t2, · · · , t2︸ ︷︷ ︸, · · · , tLk , · · · , tLk︸ ︷︷ ︸]T . (3)
This is employed for ease of analysis.
By assuming an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel model, the received signal vector at Bob can be written
as
r = u+ z, (4)
where z is assumed to an AWGN vector.
As |ρsρt | ≫ 1 and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
sufficiently high, the transmitted message is assumed to be
completely recoverable (often enhanced by error-correcting
codes) for both Bob and Eve. Therefore, one can assume that
the transmitted signal vector s is known to both Bob and Eve.
When s is available at the receiver, it can cancel the message
from the received signal samples and the message-free version
of a tag can be retrieved [6], which takes the form of
y = x+w, (5)
where x = t and w is the zero-mean additive white Gaus-
sian noise vector with variance E[w†iwj ] = δijγ
−1
t ILt and
γt denotes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) observed by the
authentication tags.
B. A Coding Formulation
Given a message s ∈ S, it is possible to generate a code
C(s), which comprised of 2Lk codewords, namely,
C(s) = {c1(s), · · · , c2Lk (s)}, (6)
where each codeword ck(s) = τ (s,k) is indexed by a possible
key k ∈ K with k − 1 = κ(k) denoting the decimal number
expression of the binary vector k. There are |K| = 2Lk
codewords. Now, the code rate of C(s) can be defined as
Rc =
Lk
Lt
. (7)
Consider that Alice wants to authenticate with Bob, she
normally sends a message s, and then a tag ck(s) = τ (s,k) is
generated using the shared key k. Equivalently, the generation
of the tag for a given message s can be considered as an
encoding process of
τ(s, ·) : K → T . (8)
As the message s is generated according to a finite message
set S, one have to consider an ensemble of codes Ω(C) =
{C(s) : s ∈ S}, which is of fixed rate Rc.
This ensemble of codes Ω(C) is revealed to both Alice and
Bob. From a standard cryptographic view, this code ensemble
is also revealed to Eve.
Definition 1: The minimum Hamming distance of the code
ensemble Ω(C) can be defined as
dmin (Ω(C)) = min
s∈S
min
k 6=kˆ
dH
(
τ(s,k), τ(s, kˆ)
)
, (9)
where dH(c1, c2) denotes the Hamming distance of two binary
vectors c1 and c2.
Now, the task of physical-layer authentication can be for-
mally formulated as a hypothesis testing problem as follows.
♣ Bob decides if y is from Alice or not by assuming that
s,k, τ(·, ·) are available;
♠ Eve tries to retrieve k from y by assuming that
s, τ(·, ·) are available.
III. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A. General Formulation
To complete the authentication process, Bob requires to
verify that whether the response signal y is from Alice or
not. If the response signal is not from Alice but Eve (an
impersonation attacker), it is assumed that Eve generates
length-Lk binary random vector kE for authentication as there
is no any information about kA(= kB) available. Essentially,
this is cast as a binary hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : K = kB (10)
H1 : K = kE (11)
where K denotes the acknowledged key.
Hypothesis testing is the task of deciding which of two
hypotheses, H1 or H0, is true, when one is given the value u
of a random variable U (e.g., the outcome of a measurement),
namely, U = u. In our case, U = (Y,K), u = (y,kB). We
begin with the formulation of the optimum binary hypothesis
testing, i.e.,
η = log
pH0(U = u)
pH1(U = u)
= log
p(y,K = kB)
p(y)p(K = kB)
(12)
= log
p(y|K = kB)∑
k∈F
L
k
2
p(y|K = k)p(K = k) . (13)
3We point out that in the case of H1, the generation of the
message and key is independent to each other as there is no
means to efficiently gauss the key.
As the message s is assumed to be available, it is clear that
p(y|k) ∝ exp
[
− (y − t)
†(y − t)
2σ2w
]
(14)
with t = τ(s,k).
In general, this binary hypothesis testing problem in its
optimum form can not be easily tackled as it requires to
enumerate 2K binary vectors of k with a priori uniform
distribution. However, its performance can be information-
theoretically bounded [9], which is summarized as follows.
B. Detection Probability vs. False Alarm Probability
Let PD = 1 − α be the detection probability, namely,
the probability of successful declaration of H0 when H0 is
actually true, and Pf = β be the false alarm probability,
namely, the probability of false declaration of H0 when H1 is
actually true.
Let the function d(α, β) be defined by
d(α, β) = α log
α
1− β + (1− α) log
1− α
β
. (15)
With optimal hypothesis testing (12), its detection probabil-
ity and false alarm probability are closely connected.
Lemma 1: [9] The detection probability 1−α and the false
alarm probability β satisfy
d(α, β) ≤ DKL (p(y,kB)||p(y)p(kB)) = I (Y ;K) (16)
where I (Y ;K) denotes the mutual information between two
random variables Y and K , and
DKL (f(x)||g(x)) =
∑
x
f(x) log
f(x)
g(x)
(17)
for two probability distributions f(x), g(x).
C. A Suboptimal Solution
As the optimum hypothesis testing is difficult to implement,
we propose to use a simple test statistic
η = cTBy, (18)
and ζ is further compared to a threshold value ̺ for making
a final decision, where cB = τ(s,kB) is the codeword due to
the input of kB at Bob.
This approach can be viewed as a code acquisition approach
encountered in code-division multiple-access (CDMA) com-
munication systems, where cB can be considered as a unique
PN code, which is available at the sides of both Alice and
Bob, but keeps unknown to any potential attacker.
In both hypotheses, η is the sum of Lt normally distributed
random variables, which is still normally distributed. There-
fore, it suffices to compute its mean and variance.
In the case of hypothesis H0, one can show that
η|H0 = Lt + z0, (19)
where z0 =
∑Lt
i=1 c
B
i wi. We denote its mean and variance as
η¯0 , E{η|H0} = Lt,
σ2H0 , Var{η|H0} = Ltγ−1t . (20)
By decomposing the hypothesis H1 into a series of sub-
hypothesises
{
Hsk1 : H1, S = s,K = kE
}
, i.e., by further as-
suming that the transmitted signal is s and Eve impersonates
Alice using the key kE , we have
η|Hsk1 = Lt − 2dH (τ(s,kB), τ(s,kE)) + z1, (21)
where z1 =
∑Lt
i=1 c
B
i wi. Then,
η¯sk1 ,E{η|H1, s,kE} = Lt − 2dH (τ(s,kB), τ(s,kE)) ,
σ2Hsk
1
,Var{η|H1, s,kE} = Ltγ−1t . (22)
It is clear that η|H0 ∼ N
(
η¯0, σ
2
H0
)
and η|Hsk1 ∼
N
(
η¯sk1 , σ
2
Hsk
1
)
.
The authentication is typically claimed if η ≥ ̺. The thresh-
old ̺ of this test is determined for a false alarm probability β
according to the distribution of η|H1
̺ = argmin
̺′
Es,kE
[
Q
(
̺′ − η¯sk1
σHsk
1
)]
≥ β, (23)
where
Q(x) =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt. (24)
The detection probability can be simply computed as
PD = Q
(
̺− η¯0
σH0
)
. (25)
IV. A DECODING APPROACH FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS
For a physical-layer authentication system, we can char-
acterize it using a quadruple {S,K,Ω(C), p(y|x)}. In this
paper, we always assume a memory-less channel and hence,
p(y|x) =∏Lti=1 p(yi|xi).
A. Adversary Model
Eve, as the adversary, is an aware receiver and knows the
authentication scheme that Alice and Bob are using. However,
she does not know the shared secret key between Alice and
Bob. She can be a passive attacker or active attacker. As an
active attacker, Eve can perform impersonation attacks.
B. Passive Attacks: A Decoding Approach for Recovery of Key
As a passive attacker, Eve only monitors all frames inside
the network during authentication, and tries to learn kB from
whatever it gets.
Firstly, we consider the noiseless setting as in a classic
authentication application above the physical layer, in which
Eve can directly acquire the signal s and the tag y = τ(s,kB).
Given s and if the encoding rule
τ(s, ·) : K → T
is a bijection, Eve can recover the key k by generating a
lookup table of size 2Lk and searching over this table for
finding the key kE , which admits y = τ(s,kE).
4In the language of coding, it means that the recovery of
key can be considered as decoding of the received signal Y
to its maximum possible encoding input Kˆ(Y ). Given s, if
any decoder Kˆ(Y ) is of computational complexity O(2Lk),
we claim that the computational security can be achieved for
this authentication system.
Definition 2: (Computational security) Given a physical-
layer authentication system {S,K,Ω(C), p(y|x)}, we claim
that this system is computationally secure if for any decoder
Kˆ(Y ), its computation complexity is of O(2Lk).
For ensuring computational security, it requires that no any
efficient decoding algorithm exists for any code C(s) ∈ Ω(C).
Since the publication of Shannon’s original paper in 1948, the
search of the codes for achieving the channel capacity has
come a long way. Currently, linear codes and their efficient
decoding algorithms have been extensively studied. Therefore,
for construction of a good physical layer authentication sys-
tem, linear code ensembles should be better avoided as their
complexity can often be reduced due to the linearity of codes.
In the classic authentication scenarios, Eve can observe
several pairs of (message,tag), namely, (si, ti = τ(si,k)), i =
1, · · · , I . For computational security, it means that Eve is still
hopeless for getting an estimate of k with many observation
pairs (si, ti). In the language of coding, this can be well
justified as each pair (si, ti) reflects an codeword of C(si).
If si 6= sj , ti and tj reveal the structure of two different
codes, i.e., C(si) and C(sj).
Secondly, we consider the noise setting, as seen in the
physical-layer authentication scenarios.
Definition 3: Let the binary codeword c ∈ C, which is
further modulated with x(c) and transmitted over the channel
p(y|x), the received vector y ∈ RLt . A maximum-likelihood
(ML) decoding algorithm decodes the vector y into a code-
word cˆ, such that
cˆ = max
c∈C
p (y|x(c)) . (26)
Definition 4: (ML recoverable) Given y ∈ RLt and s,
where y = τ(s,k) +w. For an ML decoder kˆ(y), we mean
that
kˆ = max
k∈K
p(y|k, s). (27)
If Pr(kˆ 6= kA) = 0, we claim that the authentication key is
ML recoverable.
In what follows, we consider a binary-input continuous-
output AWGN channel (Bi-AWGN). Its capacity C2 (γt) is a
function of the signal-to-noise ratio γt, which can be explicitly
expressed as
C2(γt) =
[
1− 1√
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(y−β)
2/2 log2
(
1 + e−2βy
)
dy
]
,
where β =
√
2γt.
The SP59 bound of Shannon [10] provides a lower bound on
the decoding error probability of block codes transmitted over
the AWGN channel. With a coding approach for physical-layer
authentication, the best possible decoding probability with
ML decoding for a potential eavesdropper can now be lower
bounded with the Shannon’s 1959 sphere-packing bound.
Lemma 2: (The 1959 Sphere-Packing Lower Bound [10])
For a physical-layer authentication system, characterized by
the quadruple {S,K,Ω(C), p(y|x)}. Let a message s ∈ S be
sent, and the authentication tags are assumed to be transmited
over a Bi-AWGN channel with the signal-to-noise ratio of γt.
For any decoder Kˆ , it is clear that K → τ(s,K) → X →
Y → Kˆ form a Markov process. Let Pe = Pr(K 6= Kˆ), we
have that
Pe > PSPB (Lt, θ, γt) ,
where
PSPB (Lt, θ, γt) = Q(
√
2Ltγt) +
Lt − 1√
2π
e−Ltγt
·
∫ π/2
θ
sin(φ)Lt−2fLt(
√
2Ltγt cos(φ))dφ,
fL(x) =
1
2
L−1
2 Γ
(
L+1
2
) ∫ ∞
0
zL−1 exp
(
−z
2
2
+ zx
)
dz,
and θ ∈ [0, π] satisfies the inequality 2−LtR ≤ ΩLt (θ)ΩLt(π) with
ΩLt(θ) =
2π
Lt−1
2
Γ(Lt−12 )
∫ θ
0
(sin(φ))Lt−2dφ.
The SP59 bound is exponentially increased with the block
length and the exponent is strictly negative for all Rc >
C2(γt), it become clear that above capacity the minimum
probability of error goes to 1 exponentially fast with the block
length. Hence, one can achieve the information security for
physical-layer authentication, which, however, not the case for
classic authentication.
Lemma 3: (Information security) Given a physical-layer
authentication system {S,K,Ω(C)} over an AWGN channel of
the SNR γt, we claim that this system can achieve information
security if Rc > C(γt) when Lt →∞.
Numerically, we’ll show that the decoding error probability
can go to 1 even with short block length if the signal-to-noise
ratio γt is sufficiently low.
C. Impersonation Attacks
In a so-called impersonation attack at time i , the
adversary (Eve) waits until he has seen the ciphertexts
{(s1, t1), (s2, t2), · · · , (si−1, ti−1)} (which he lets pass un-
changed to the receiver) and then creates and sends a fraudu-
lent ciphertext (si, ti) which he hopes to be accepted by the
receiver as the ith ciphertext.
Essentially, Eve’s strategy is to maximize the false accep-
tance rate by selecting a suitable message si and a key kE ,
namely,
max
si∈S,kE∈K
E{η|H1, si,kE}. (28)
5Equivalently, this means
min
si∈S,kE∈K
dH (τ(si,kB), τ(si,kE)) , (29)
as shown by (21).
Lemma 4: In order to minimize the false acceptance rate
of an impersonate attacker, the minimum Hamming distance
of the code ensemble Ω(C), namely, dmin (Ω(C)), should be
maximized.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider a physical-layer authentication system, in which
binary key is of length Lk = 128 and the authentication
tag is of length Lt = 256. To attack this physical-layer
authentication system, a potential eavesdropper tries to do her
or his best to decode the key. As one can consider the block
codes of rate Rc over a Bi-AWGN channel of the SNR γt, the
equivalent Eb/N0 can be defined as Eb/N0 = R−1c γt.
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Fig. 1. Sphere-packing low bound on the decoding error probability and
detection probability (or successful authentication rate) versus Eb/N0.
Fig. 1 shows the SP59 bound on the decoding error prob-
ability and detection probability (successful authentication
rate) for different Eb/N0’s. As the eavesdropper cannot do
better than a ML decoder, the SPB bound provides an over-
estimate of its capability on guessing the key. As shown, the
eavesdropper becomes hopeless in guessing the key when-
ever Eb/N0 is below to about -1 dB as the decoding error
probability is around 1. However, the authentication system
does work well with almost perfect successful authentication
rate. In simulations, the threshold is set so as the false alarm
probability is lower than 0.01.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a channel coding approach for physical layer
authentication. With this new approach, the computational
security for classic authentication schemes can be well for-
mulated using a new decoding approach. The well-designed
physical-layer authentication can ensure a new degree of se-
curity, namely, information-security, thanks to the introduction
of channel noises during transmission.
For design of a physical layer authentication system, the
success authentication rate should be balanced with an ac-
ceptable false acceptance rate. It is beneficial for use of long
tags, as the success authentication rate can be enhanced while
the false acceptance rate can be reduced. In the meantime,
numerical results show that even with short tags (of length
256), the best possible decoding error probability under ML
decoding can approach 1 while the authentication still work
well.
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